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THE NEW SHARES MARKET: REGULATORY INTERVENTION,
FORECAST ERRORS AND CHALLENGES
INTRODUCTION
A newissueis definedunderMalaysianlawsasthesaleofunissuedordinarysharesout




in thiscountry,andis consistentwith themeaningof initialpublicofferings(orIPOs)of
privatecompaniesandgovernment-linkedenterprises.
Investors,entrepreneurs,financial managersand financial intermediariesneedto
understandthemarketforinitialpublicofferingsornewshareissuesonthestockexchange
becauseof its importanceas a sourceof investmentcapitalthathelpsin thenation's




In 1998,therewasadeclinein thetotalamountof equityfundsraisedduetoa financial










andSecondBoard)in2002.In termsofvalue,theywereworthoverRM807billion in 1996
decreasingtoRM553billion in 1999(theaftermathof the1997financialcrisis).Fromthe
startof thegovernment'sprivatizationprogram(transferof enterpriseownershipfrom
publictoprivate)fromMarch1983to1998,434firmshadbeenprivatized.Of this,40firms
worthmorethanRMI00 billion hadbeenlistedon theKualaLumpur StockExchange,
constitutingalmost15percentof thetotalmarketcapitalization.
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WHY DO FIRMS GO PUBLIC?
Malaysia,anemergingeconomy,haslessthanonepercentof thetotalnumberof firmsin
theeconomyon itsofficialstockexchanges.Theaverageageof firmsgoingpublicis 13
yearsandthis is morethantwicethenumberof yearsrequiredfor listingon themain
board.Therefore,contrarytopublicopinion,firmsseekinglistingarenotcashingoutby
goingpublic.
In theUK, adevelopedeconomy,onepercentof thetotalnumberoffirmsin theeconomy
islistedontheofficialstockexchanges.In Europe,theaverageageof firmsgoingpublicis
50yearscomparedto 6 yearsin theUS (Loughran,Ritterand Rydqvist,1994),which
supportstheideathattherearelargeandmaturedfirmswell qualifiedtobe listedbut
havenotmadethedecisionto gopublicnor giventhepermissionto list.The reported
averageshort-termIPQ underpricingof9.5%andanover-subscriptionrateof 18.8times
for UK firms (FranksandBrennan,1997)shouldbe an addedincentivefor ownersof
privatefirmsto increasethevalueof thefirm.However,thereis no evidenceto support
thenotionthatfirmsrushtogopublicjustto increasethevalueof thefirm.
Severalpossiblereasonscanbeofferedastowhy afirmmakesadecisiontogopublic(or
to getlistedon thestockexchange).The commoncitationsarediversification,growth
financing,facilitatingfuturere-issuanceofshares,portfoliorebalancing,improvedcredit
rating, increasedproductivity through employeestock ownership schemesand
performanceevaluationbasedon marketvalue.Qualitativereasonsoftencited are
attractingmorequalifiedpersonnel,increasedemployeemoraleandincreasedbargaining
power in negotiatingwith thefirm stakeholders(Pargano,Panettaand Zingales,1998;
RydqvistandHogholm,1995).
Goingpubliccouldalsobeconsideredasastagein thefirm'sgrowthprocess,whichevery
firm is expectedtoexperiencein itslife cyclewith themanagementmakingaconscious
decisiontoremainprivateortogopublic.Thefirm'sdecisiontogopublichastobe~ased
onthecostandbenefitperspective.Pargano(1993)providessomeinsightsintotheaspects
of trade-off betweencostsand benefitsof going public. The costs involve direct
administrationandunderwritingcosts,theunderpricingcosts,theannualdisclosurecosts,








timeof thedecisionmightaffectafirm'sdecisiontogopublic. IPQ cyclesarepositively
correlatedwithbusinesscycles,stockreturnscycle,currencydevaluationsandregulatory
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changes(Rees,1996).Forexample,ineconomicboomtimes,goodinvestmentopportunities










allowinggreaterparticipationof foreigninvestorsin theequitymarketleadto a lower




socio-economicmotiveof theNew EconomicPolicy(NEP) hasplayedanimportantrole
in thesuccessofthenewissuesmarket.Thereisadesiretorebalancetheownershipofthe
privateinvestmentcapitalalongvariousethnicgroups.Oneeffectiveway of achieving




totalequityownershipof listedcorporationsin thecountry,theBumiputras ownedonly
2.4percentin 1970:thegovernmenthroughtheNEP aimstoachieveatleast30percent
ownership.As of2001,theequityownershiphasgoneup to23percent.








concerningthe new sharesmarketon the Kuala Lumpur StockExchange(KLSE).
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NEW SHARE ISSUES IN MALAYSIA
In Malaysia,it is mandatoryfor firmsgettinglistedtoengagetheservicesof merchant
bankers.TheapplicationisvettedbytheSecuritiesCommission(CapitalIssuesCommittee
andtheForeignIssuesCommitteeprior toMarch,1995),theRegistrarof Companiesand






conditionschangingrelativetopricesfixed atthetimeof applications.This is termedthe
approvaldelayrisk in thenewissuesmarket.
Approvaldelayriskismuchhigherthaninmajormarkets,wheretheregulationsaremore
flexible,and approvalmuch speedier.While regulationsin Malaysiaensurethatno











theverylow underwritingfeeof aboutonepercentfor managinga flotationcompared
with threeormorepercentinothermarkets.Thisriskoffailurein off-takeofissuesistermed
theunderwritingrisk.Low fixedpricesreducetheunderwritingriskaswell.
New issueoffershelpto raisefinancefor expansionandprovideanadditionalsourceof
low-costfinance.Companieslistedin theNew Yorkmarketraisecapitalata lowercost,
thesavingsamountothree-quartersofonepercentperdollaroffundscomparedtounlisted
companies.By thesamelogic,whenownersofacompanyhaveconsiderableamountsof
wealthinvestedin a company,andareinterestedin diversifyingtheirportfolioto add
liquiditytotheirinvestments,theyusuallyoffernewissuestoreducetheirownexposure
torisk. Giventhisfinancialeconomicsofowningacompany,theownersofcompaniesare
willing topasspartof theirprofitablerealinvestmentsin thecompanyby reducingtheir





makingabid toownpartof these30percentofequityof companiescantherefore xpect
toobtaintruevalue,andahigherreturn,thanin alternativeinvestmentsin thesecondary
market.
Purchaseof shareslistedin thesecondarymarketcannotobtainthisvalue. This is the
insidervaluefactor,whichmakesofferpriceslowertoyieldahighernewissuereturn.A
reviewof theprospectusesof all firms listedover 1975to 2001period indicatesthat
management'smainpurposeforlistingistogetfundsforbusinessexpansion,whichwould
notbepossiblewithoutsharinga littleof thevalueof thefirm - releasing30percentof
equity- with theoutsiders,who applyfor newissues.Notethatthisthirdfactorshould
makenewissuesmarketmoreprofitable,holdingotherthingsconstant:hefirsttwofactors
beingtheapprovaldelayriskandunderwritingrisk.Thelonger-runannualreturninclusive
of dividendsin thesecondarymarketis 18percent.2
Over-subscriptionof mostnew issueskeepsfeedingthefrenzyfor new issues.Earlier
studiessuggestan averageover-subscriptionof 40times(Dawson,1987;Yong,1991).
However, the latestevidence(Ariff and Shamsher,2002)shows an averageover-




timestheaveragenormalreturnsof 18percentper annumin thestockmarket.In the
1980s,therewas only onenewissueoverpriced(meaningtheclosingfirst day trading
pricewaslessthantheofferprice).In 1991there'wasoneissueandin 1997therewerenine
newissuesoverpricedasaresultof thesharemarketdeclineafterthe1997financialcrisis.
This is almostinsignificantnumbercomparedto thetotalissuesthatarepredominantly
underpriced.Consistentwith othermarkets,mostof thenewissuesarelistedatthepeak



















seasoningnewissues(Ibbotson,1975)arefour (of thesix)well knowntheoriesthathad
beenextensivelytestedand affirmedin developedandemergingmarkets.Two other
theoriesare asymmetricinformation (Leyland and Pyle, 1977)and fad hypothesis
(AggrawalandRivoli,1990).LeylandandPyle(1977)suggesthatgivendifferentsetsof













et al. 1994).However,muchattentionhasnotbeenpaid asyetto explainthevery large
differencesin theaverageunderpricinginemergingmarkets.Toappealjusttotheemerging





(Bucketal., 1981)andashighas135percentin Malaysia(Shamsheretal.,1993).Also, the
averageunderpricingin themoredevelopedsharemarketsismuchlowerthantheaverage
in theemerging/developingmarkets:afactconsistentwiththelow riskargumentin the
developedmarkets.Theonlyexplanationgivenfor thelargedifferencesin theemerging




discountin thetestedmarket,noneof the12merchantbankersin Malaysiahaveanyrisk
of flotationor ofnotbeingsuccessful.
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For example,the averagepremiumsearnedby firms engagingtheservicesof all the
merchantbanksforthe27-yearperiod(1975-2001)is87percent(AriffandShamsher,2002).
Therefore,theoriessuggestingan investmentbanker'srisk asdrivingunderpricingare




in Table1.Thistablerevealsin measurabletermsthelargedifferencesin theunderpricing
of IPOs in selectedmarketswith differentstagesof economicgrowth.
Table1: AverageUnderpricingRelativetoLongRunAverageReturnsinSelectedSecondaryMarkets


























of seasonedissues.Investorssuccessfullysubscribingto all thenew issuesin these





this averageis: underpricingof 36.5percentin Singaporeand 135percentin Malaysia
(Shamsheretal.,1993)and76per centin India (Ariff, 1999).Theaveragereturnin the
seasonedissuesof thesemarketsis 20.67percent(Ariff etal.,1998).




comparedwith 1.51times) than developedmarkets.Obviously, thereis excessive
underpricingin theemergingmarkets.Theorderofmagnitudeof theunderpricingona
crudecomparisonis4.9times(82.5%:16.8%)in theemergingstockmarketsrelativetothe
developedmarkets!This is a significantdifference.However,thesix theoriesmentioned
earliercannotadequatelyexplaintheseexcessiveunderpricingandmostlikelythereare
otherunspecifiedfactorsresponsiblefor thelargeunderpricing.
UNDERPRICING OF MALAYSIAN NEW ISSUES




years.Both (a) and (b) enableus to distinguishshort and long termprice changes
respectively.Finally,theunderpricingiscomparedwiththeoveralllongrunmarketreturn







SHORT AND LONG-RUN PERFORMANCE OF IPOs

























of theofferprice.However,it mustbe notedthattheseresultsassumethatthatevery
investorgetsall thesharesappliedfor,whichisnottrue,asthechanceofallocationisone
in35forasmallinvestor(itismorefavorableforlarge-sizedapplications).Also, therelevant














At theendof threeyears,theunderpricingis 77percent.Hence,if wecomparetheshort
rungainof 135percentagainsthe77percentinyear3,it showsthatthelongrunreturns
aresignificantlylowerthantheshort-runprice-pressuredtemporaryreturns.Is77percent
returnoverthreeyearsa high return?Thelong run returnfromholdingnewissuesis
moreprofitable(assuminga full andnot partialallocation)thanthe18percentrateof
annualreturnin theKLSE overthe1975-1990period.However,notall investorswill get
a full allocationandsomearenot allocatedatall. If investorsapplyfor largerlots,the
probabilityof allocationis likelytobehigher.Largerinvestorswill thereforereaphigher
returnsevenaftercostsbecauseof thehigheroddsofbeingallocated.
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INSIGHTS FROM THE RESULTS
Malaysianregulatorsappeartohaveput intoplacemechanismsfor interventionin the
stockmarketlistingprocesstoachievepositiveratesofreturnsforallnewissues,toreduce
approvaldelayandunderwritingrisk. Unlikeothermarkets,whereabouta thirdof all
newissuesyieldnegativereturnstoapplicants,Malaysia'snewissueshaveneveryielded
a negativereturnrelativeto theofferpricesoveranyperiod,Added to this is thatthe
publicperceptionof lucrativegainshavebeenfannedby inaccurateanalysisofprevious
researchon thissubject,whichestimatedthegainsto speculatorsandnot to longterm
investors.Theaverageexcessreturnof 135percentonthefirsttradingdayis thelargest
reportedfor anycountry.However,the77percentreturnsoverthreeyearsperiodis 4.28





lowerreturnin thelongtermis therelevantrate.Thesefindingsareconsistentwith that
documentedin theUS newissuesmarket(AggrawalandRivoli,1990).Thisbehaviouris
termedthefadeffect:it isperhapsdrivenbytheheavypromotionofnewissuesaspartof
a nationalpolicyagendaaswell astheattentionfactornew issuesreceivein themass
media,oftenendorsedbythegovernmentstomakeitssharedistributionpolicysuccessful.










etal. 1994).This sectiondiscussesthepossibilityofworld'shighestunderpricingof new




publicparticipatingin shareissuein thismarket.Theexcessiveunderpricingis perhaps
duetotwoinvestmentregulationsimplementedin thismarket.
Firmsseekinglistingapprovalsin thisemergingmarketarerequiredto decideon final
offerpricesatthetimeof applicationtotheSecuritiesCommission(SC),whichconsiders




andbeganto permittheinvestmentbankersandthefirm seekinga listingto settheir
consensuspricesas consideredsuitablefor the marketconditions.That is, regulators
discontinuedfixingpricesofnewissuesfrom1996.
It canbeseenthatthepricesettingpracticeprior to doingawaywith thepricefixing
regulationin 1996isinsharpcontrastopracticesprevailinginseveraldevelopedmarkets.
In developedmarkets,pricesaredeterminedjointlyby theinvestmentbankersandthe
firm on thebasisof redherringoffersmadeby potentialinvestorsmakingnon-binding
offerstotheinvestmentbankersatorclosertotheexpectedtimeofapprovalof listingby

















standarddeviationof returnsrelativeto13to17percentin theNew YorkStockExchange
(Ariff etal.,1998).Thustheriskofpricechanges- basisrisk- toaccommodatelikelyprice
changesin theforwardperiodis morelikely,whichconstitutesa dangerin anemerging




There areother less obviousregulations.A new economicpolicy to restructurethe




seekinglistingbe sold to theBumiputrapopulationor to mutualfunds ownedby the
r
1
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indigenouspopulation.1oThisrulewasincorporatedin theapprovalproceduresnormally




percentperyear,theadoptionof a simpleaveragepricemultipleastheguideto fix the
offerpricestendedto downsizetheestimatedofferpricesapprovedby theregulators.
This mustnecessarilyinducehigherunderpricing.Again, regulationappearsto be a
possiblefactorfor thehighunderpricing.TodatetheNEP hasbeensuccessfulin sorting
out the inequitableownershipdistributionof privatecapitalbetweendifferentethnic




of newissuesharepricesatlow levelstoencouragemassparticipation.Theintentis to
createrewardsforparticipationin theshareissuesby settinghighunderpricingtoensure
successof apublicpolicysocrucialto thefutureof thiscountry.Theimplementationof
suchapolicyreducesthepoliticalcosts.To datethereis no publishedevidenceon this
issueexcepthatdocumentedbyAriff andShamsher(2002).
TEST FOR THE REGULATORY EFFECT
To testif the implementationin 1976of the new public policy on shareownership
distributionhasin somewaycontributedtowardsthehigherlevelof underpricing,the




regulationcameinto forcein 1996:thesecondregulationis aboutfreeingrestrictionson
settingissuepriceby regulatorsin 1996.Therewere150newissuesin theperiodof free
pricingover1996-1999.Themarket-adjustedreturnswereestimatedfor eachsub-period
(1968-1975,1976-1995,1996-1999).Thisis inaccordancewiththeacceptedmethodologyof
adjustinggrossreturnsof newissuesfor market-widechangesin prices(Levis,1993).n
New issuesincluded16governmentcompanies,whichhaveverylow systematicrisk.
The averagemarket-adjustedunderpricingreturnwas estimatedfor eachnewissuein
eachsub-period.Theanalysiswas tailoredto ascertainwhetherthereis a positiveand
significantunderpricingofnewissues.Thisisatestofunderpricingundertheconventional
explanations- underwriters'reputation,seasoning,winner'scurse,exanteuncertaintyof
performance,etc.all of whichpredictasignificantpositiveabnormalreturn.It answers
thequestionastowhetherthenewissuepriceperformanceusingour newdatasetalso
substantiatesthebasicunderpricinghypothesis.
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Thelevelof underpricingin thissharemarketwasfound tobethehighest.Thesecond
hypothesisis theimplementationof thenew shareallocationpolicy since1976andits
effectonunderpricing.A significantincreasein returnsin thesecondsub-periodwould












EVIDENCE ON POSSIBLE REGULATORY EFFECTS
(i) Underpricingin thepreandpostregulationperiod
Thefindingsreportedin thissectionarebasedonananalysisofIPOsoverthreeregulatory
regimesovera thirty-yearperiodfrom1968t<?1999.Prior to 1976is theno-regulation
period;regulationone(30%distributionrule)from1975onwardsandregulationtwo(rule





returnson thefirst dayor duringtheinitial periodof listing.The lowestunderpricing




deviation)of returnswas54percentcomparedto 131percentin thepost-regulationone




The findingsreportedin Table4 showthattheaveragemarket-adjustedunderpricing

































one first-dayunderpricingis 3.16times;the correspondingnumberduring thepost-
regulationoneperiodis 6.56times.Thus,theevidenceis consistentwith thefindings
reportedby others'overshorterperiodswith smallersamples:Dawson(1987)andYong
(1991)reportedrespectively166and167percentover1978-83and1983-88.Thefindings
establishevidencefor underpricinghypothesisasvalid in thisemergingsharemarket.12
Underpricingin thismarketis still thehighest,andcannotbecompletelyattributedto
conventionalexplanations.Butthedifferenceof61percentfirst-dayunderpricingduring
theregulation-oneperiodsupportstheregulationeffect,thoughtherecouldbe other
unspecifiedfactorsequallycontributingto thehigh underpricing.The coefficientsof
variationin thetwoperiodsis almostthesame,implyingthatthedifferenceoverthetwo
periodscannotbeduetodifferencein volatilityexperiencedin thetwoperiods.



























month.In thepost-regulationperiod,differentpricebehaviouris observed.In thepost-
regulationoneperiod,theaverage109percentunderpricingin thefirstmonthstarted
decliningto103percentin thethirdmonth,andthanincreasingto109percentin thesixth







of 38timesduringthepost-regulationoneperiod.It is conceivablethatthedemandfor
newissuesweresustainedathighlevels,andthelargeunderpricingis partlydueto the
largedemandcreatedby thepublicity.In factthisis indirectpublicityevidence.
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(iii) EffectofRegulationTwo
Theunderpricingin postregulation-twoperiod(inclusiveandexclusiveof crisisperiod
betweenJuly 1997toDecember1998)is summarizedin Table6.










063 85 46 1
Month
02 61 45 5*
*Significantlyunderpricedatorbetterthan0.01probabilitylevels.
Source:Ariff &Shamsher(2002)
Thoughashortperiod,it hada largenumberof listingsjustaheadof theAsian financial
crisis.Thecrisisperiodof July 1997-December1998affectedthemarketbadlywith new
issuesalmostdisappearingfromthescene.Forexample,therewere92listingsin 1996,87
in 1997,26in 1998andonly20in 1999.Theimportantthingto rememberis thatthough
thereis freedomin settingofferprice,approvalisstill neededfrom theauthorities.
Theunderpricingin thefree-pricingperiodin Table6showsthatthemeanunderpricing
was 117percentonlistingday,inclusiveof thecrisisperiodJuly 1997toDecember1998,
and156percentif dataovercrisisperiodis excluded.Theunderpricingis stillveryclose
tothoseobservedduringtheregulationoneperiodwhentheauthoritiesweresettinglow
offerpricesbasedon a tableof historicalpricemultiples.Thehighunderpricingin this
period,which looksonly slightlylessthanthe135percentin theregulatedperiod,is
statisticallysignificant.Surprisingly,thepostulatedexpectationofasmallerrateofunderpricing
during thefree-pricingperiodcannotbesupported.It is possiblethattheimplementationof
thesecondrulingmaynothavebeenenforcedstrictly.Therefore,pricingmayhavebeen
still subjectedto theprice-earningsrule;thoughofficiallywithdrawn,perhapsit is still
practicedby firmsandinvestmentbankers.It appearsthattheabandonmentof theold




regulatoryeffect.Two regulationsadoptedby theregulatorshad the indirecteffectof
loweringtheofferpriceswhilealsocreatingalargeshort-termdemandeffectontheprices
thatprevailduringtheinitiallistingperiod,sayoverthefirstsixmonths.Thereturnsin
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thepre-30percentregulationoneperiod(1968-1975)arehalfofthatin thepost-regulation
periodover1976-1995,insupportoftheregulationone(30%ofallnewissuestoBumiputras).
Thelongrunaverageunderpricingis athirdof theinitialunderpricing,in supportof the




INDIRECT EVIDENCE OF REGULATORY EFFECT
Prior to1960,therewasonlyonetradingfloorin SingaporewhenSingaporewasalsopart
of Malaysia.Thestockexchangein Singaporeservedasa coterminousharemarketof
bothcountriesrightup to1989.Thejointlistingandtradingarrangementsceasedwiththe




Throughouttheperiodof study,no changesto regulationof thekind implementedin
Malaysiawerepassedin Singapore.
Thoughthetwomarketservedastwinmarketsforthenewissues,reportedfiguressuggest





This in itselfis indirectevidenceon our postulationof regulatoryeffecton underpricingof new
issuesin Malaysia.Thismarketspecificeffectof regulationsonnewissuesmarketcannot
begeneralizedtoothermarkets.
VALIDATION OF FORECAST EARNINGS IN IPO
PROSPECTUSES - ARE AUDITORS DOING A FAIR JOB?
Thefinancialcrisisin Asia andtherecentcorporatescandalsin theUnitedStatesareall
linkedin somewaytotheweakenforcementofgovernancerequirements.Competentand
independentinternalandexternalauditfunctionscouldensureagoodandfaircorporate
governancepractice.If auditorsfail in thisrole,theycanunderminethefinancialmarkets
by consentingto misleadinvestorsthroughmisinformation.Therearemanyissuesof
corporategovernanceintheIPQ market,however,in thispaperthefocusisonthecredibility
of the audit serviceprovided by largeand small auditorsin verifying the financial
informationdocumentedin theprospectusesfor useby potentialinvestors.
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Legislationsconcerningsourceof financing,contentand theform of prospectusesis
providedby theCompaniesAct, 1965,andtheKualaLumpurStockExchange'sListing
Requirements.Section39of theAct andPart6oftheRequirementstipulatethecontents










reduceuncertaintyabout the firm. This information is usually provided through
prospectuses,whichincludesinformationonfinancialstatus,futureprospectsandaudited





reportedinformationbasedon thequalityof auditserviceprovidedby largeandsmall
firms. Prospective'investorsperceivefinancialstatementsauditedby morereputable
auditingfirms (usuallythelargeinternationalauditfirms)asmorecrediblethanthose




from seekingalternativesourcesof informationfor verificationpurposes.Sincethe






theperceivedqualityof theaudit.A higherperceivedqualityofauditis morelikelytobe
associatedwithmorereputableauditingfirmsbecauseof theirlargercollateralproperties
(andthereforegreaterpresumedreputationat stake)and investors'confidencein the
accuracyandreliabilityofinformationaudited.Therefore,themorereputabletheauditing
firm employedby an IPO, the lessthechanceof misrepresentationby themanagers'
disclosuresandconsequentlylesscostsofmonitoringandlowerearningsforecasterrors.
ShamsherMohamad: TheNewSharesMarket: RegulatoryIntervention,ForecastErrors andChallenges






forecasterrorsof listedfirmswas carriedout for theperiods1975-1990,1991-1996and
1997-2001usingasampleof65,100and150firmsrespectively.Theresultsaresummarized
in Table7.
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Theover-forecastof profitsin theprospectusesby listingfirmsincreasedfurtherduring
the1997-2001period.Themeanforecasterrorisnegative17.82percenthatis onaverage





basedon largeandsmallfirm status.To ascertainanyassociationbetweenthesizeof
auditorsandforecasterrors,ananalysiswascarriedoutandthefindingssummarizedin
Table7 impliesthatpotentialinvestorsin thenewsharesareindifferentto thequalityof









to 53percentin thesecondsub-periodandonly 30percentin thefirst sub-period.The
suddenstrikeandtheextentof theeconomiccrisisin thethirdsub-periodmightexplain
thelargeforecasterrorsin thisperiod.It is possiblethatauditors(predominantlyBig-
Five)weredoingafairjobof objectivelyvalidatingtheavailableinformationprovidedin
theprospectusesby thefirms,but wereunawareof theunexpectedandsuddendown
turnof theeconomyin thisperiod. Theissueiswhethertheauditorshadsomeinsightson the
forthcomingdeclinebutwerenotobligedtodiscountthisinformationin theirvalidatingprocessas
it is beyondtheiraccountability.
Thisevidencequestionstheissueof competencyandaccountabilityof auditorsin using
informationbeyondthatprovidedbythefirmsin theverificationprocess.Thisisimportant
for facilitatingthe government'svision of implementingbestcorporategovernance
practicesof firmsin thefinancialmarkets.
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information and finance. Technological advancementsthrough innovations in
computerization,miniaturization,telecommunicationsanddigitalizationhashelpedthe





in thedemiseof theBrettonWoodssystemof fixedexchangeratesandstrictcontrolson
internationalflow of funds and beingreplacedby liberalizationof capitalaccounts,
accountingforthefree-flowofshort-termcapitalacrossfinancialmarketsaroundtheworld,
explosionof securitizationof assets,andthedevelopmentof stock,bondandcurrency









short-termportfolio capitalfrom internationalfunds,fuelling thestockand property
marketstogreatheights.Duringthecrisis,thiscapitalreversedits flow by cashingout






The merchantbankersresponsiblefor gettingfirms listed need to be at par with
internationalinvestmentbankersin termsof technology,financeandservicesofferedto
clients.Thiswill implythatthesebankersneedto investin abig way in technologyand
resourcestoeffectivelycompetewithglobalplayers.Thecompetitivenessof thefinancial
servicesindustrytypicallyreliesoncosteffectiveness,operationalefficiencyandvariety















and informationused, the less likely the chanceof sudden changein the markets.
Applicationsofinternationallyacceptedaccountingprinciplesanddisclosurerequirements
would enhancetheconfidenceof internationalinvestorsand the developmentof the
financialservices ectorsuchastheInternetbrokerageservices.TheCapitalMarketPlan





of positiveeconomic"growthand prosperity.In short,theinvestmentcapitalredistribution
policyamongthedifferentethnicgroupswill beshort-changed.The30percentspecial





Regulationsgoverningtheactivitiesof thefinancial marketswill needto berevisedto suit the
changingneeds.Theregulatingagenciesthatensurefair practicesin themarketswill berequiredto
bemoreglobalin theirapproachso as to betterunderstandthecomplexrequirementsof global
financialmarkets.In aglobalenvironment,fundsflow freelybetweenstockmarkets,and
themorecompetitiveandcost-effectivemarketsareexpectedtoperformwell.Thereforeit




marketsand cross-boardertradingto widen the investorbaseand participation.For
example,alliancewith KLSE and NASDAQ and theAustralianmarketwould be the
obviousrationalsteptowardthisobjective.Thesacrificewouldbethepolicyto contain
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ENDNOTES
1. Ariff andJohnson(1990:p.15)documentherelativevolatilityofAsiansharemarkets.
Standarddeviationof ratesof returnof KLSE over1980-1990is about31.9percent




prospectustoinvestorsfor saleof sharesand(ii) theKLSE for permissiontolist the
firm.
2. ThisestimatebyAnnuar(1991)is basedonall listedcompaniesover1975-1989,and
wasextendedto1992andfoundtobe18percentperannum.
3. The only new issuesto go below theofferpriceduring initial dayswas thatof
MalaysianInternationalShippingLines:theissuewas oversubscribedon trading
dayby1.13timesonly.Thepoorperformancewasduetoasuddenmarketcorrection





5. Therearestringentassumptionsmadein orderfor this comparisonto be valid.
Investorsareassumedtobeequallysuccessfulin gettingall subscriptionsto new
issuesandthatthereis noopportunityor transactionscostincurredin thesetrades.
Consideringthesecostswill reducetheunderpricing.
6. Studiesof a fewSouthAmericanemergingmarketssuggesthattheunderpricing
thereis below 98 percentin Brazit which, therefore,has the secondhighest
underpricing:seethespringissueof 1993FinancialManagement.In Brazit thereis a





listingpriceandtheissueprice. This is usuallyapositiveamount(i.e.listingprice
exceedstheissueprice)reflectingunderpricing.The levelof thepremiumis the
premiumdividedby theissueprice,expressedasapercentage.
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9. Ariff andJohnson(1990)andAriff et al. (1998)documenttherelativevolatilityof
Asianandmajorsharemarkets.Self-listingis notpermittedin Malaysia;it is illegal
to seekapplicationsbeforetheSC andtheKualaLumpur StockExchange(KLSE)
approvelistings.This marketmicrostructurencouragesloweringof offerpricesto
reduceriskof likelyfailureof floatation.
10. The new public policy was debatedand approvedin Parliamentin 1975:see
Parliamentaryrecordsof proceedingsfor 1975in theMalaysianParliament.The
indigenouspopulation,theBumiputra,form slightlymorethan60percentof the
population,andtheirshareofprivatecapitalin theeconomywasunder10percentin
1970.To increasetheircapitalsoasto givethemcorporatecontrol,it wasdecided
thatatleast30percentofnewissueswouldbeallocatedtothemor tomutualfunds
ownedby them.Thepubliccouldsubscribeto theremaining70percentof theissue
with allocationsdoneonballotingby serialnumbers,irrespectiveof theapplicant's
indigenousstatus.
11. .Risk-adjustedfordifferentsystematicrisksQfnewissuesisnotpossiblein thismarket.
Thereis insufficientnumberofnewissuesin eachmonthtoadopttheRATS (Ritter
1987)procedurefor adjustingfor systematicriskdifferences.
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